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ABSTRACT
We use two data bases, one on Ethiopia and the other relating to Sudan, to analyse corruption. 
In the case of Sudan, the focus is on concerns with corruption as measured by whether the 
individual identifies this as the most important issue facing the country. In Ethiopia the focus 
is on the perceived corruption of state agents at the local level. Concern with, and perceptions 
of, corruption increased with education and as the individual aged. They were also influenced 
by local conditions, in the case of Sudan by the quality of local services, and in Ethiopia, by 
local drought conditions.  
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Comparing Corruption in Ethiopia and Sudan 
1. Introduction  
Corruption is perceived as a problem in many countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa the problems 
are particularly serious. Table 1 shows that Sub-Saharan Africa compares poorly with other 
developing countries in the  world. However, the Middle East, North Africa and the Arab 
world are even worse. These are all areas relatively close to the two countries we are 
studying. Compared with these Sudan is worse, and has deteriorated within this short time 
frame. Ethiopia on the other hand is markedly better and has shown signs of improvement. 
This data relates to the CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector 
rating. Other indices confirm this. For example in Transparency International’s 2013 
Corruption Perceptions Index1 Ethiopia is the 111th best country out of 177, whilst Sudan is 
174th. The only countries worse than Sudan are Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia. 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
Corruption is an important issue and can have adverse effects on both an economy and 
society. Corruption not only imposes a tax on public services and private sector activity, but 
also leads to what are possibly severe efficiency consequences (Krueger,1974; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). Seligson (2002) finds that independent of socioeconomic and demographic 
variables, exposure to corruption erodes belief in the political system in four Latin American 
countries. Seligson (2006) found that those who experience corruption, of which being asked 
for a bribe is a component part, are less likely to believe in the legitimacy of their political 
system. Supporting this, Sun and Wang (2012) conclude that negative actions by 
governments, including corruption and the abuse of privilege, significantly reduce trust in 
government. Even in high income democracies, bribery and corruption have been found to be 
associated with large and more complex public sectors that are less susceptible to political and 
hence electoral oversight (Hamilton, 2013). 
    The purpose of this current paper is to delve into this issue further by examining what 
people in Ethiopia and Sudan actually think about corruption and how this differs both 
1 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results
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spatially within the countries and across socio-economic conditions. This is being done in part 
to compare the two data bases. In addition these are similar countries, both dominated by 
agriculture and sharing a common border. But, as we have seen, Ethiopia is improving in 
terms of corruption, whereas Sudan is one of the worst countries in the world. We are hoping 
in this study to gain understanding on why this should be so, as well as to test hypotheses 
common to both.  
    The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present some background 
information upon the two countries and look at the literature on corruption perceptions. We 
then present the data we will be using for both countries. There then follows a full analysis of 
both countries with respect to corruption This analysis will firstly comprise of a discussion of 
the summary data. We will then analyse corruption at the regional and then individual level 
using regression analysis. Finally we conclude the paper. The measures of corruption we will 
be analysing are not the same in the two countries. In Sudan we will be focusing on 
corruption concerns, as reflected by the proportion of people who view it as the most pressing 
problem facing the country. In Ethiopia we will be examining people’s perceptions of 
corruption amongst various state agents. The fact that the two questions we focus on are 
different is both a plus point and a negative one. On the positive side, it allows us to examine 
the issue from two differing perspectives. On the negative side it prevents us fully replicating 
the analysis in the two countries. Despite this, common themes emerge in the impact of 
education and the impact of both individual socio-economic characteristics and the 
characteristics of the individual’s locality. This research, being based on individual 
perceptions, meets Svensson’s (2005) call for more work at the micro level on how much 
corruption actually occurs in specific contexts.  
2. Background to the Study 
2.1 Sudan  
Sudan is predominantly an agricultural country and most of the land is divided into a number 
of exclusive tribal areas (dars). The ‘tribe’ plays an important role in governance. The various 
tribes have their own institutions, and their economies, although for most areas predominantly  
agricultural, differ substantially in part because of substantial climatic differences (Nugent 
and Sanchez, 1999). The background to our analysis are the several conflicts which have 
beset the country in recent decades, indeed almost since independence from the UK in 1956. 
Since then military regimes have tended to favour the centre and the north of the country, and 
since 1984 have also been Islamic-oriented. The dominant religion in Sudan, as opposed to 
Sudan together with South Sudan, is Sunni Islam, with a small Christian minority. The 
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conflicts resulted in the establishment of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 
whose goal was to fight Islamist imposition (Johnson, 2003). The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement of 2005 eventually led to the creation of an independent state, South Sudan in 
2011, ending a civil war in which more than two million people had died since 1989 alone. 
But this has not ended all conflict within Sudan, and since then Sudan has been fighting rebels 
in the East (until 2006), as well as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) 
in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile states. This is in addition to a separate conflict in the 
western region of Darfur beginning in 2003, which has displaced nearly two million people 
and caused an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 deaths and the ongoing humanitarian crisis 
caused by the civil war in South Sudan. Much of this conflict stems from the desire of the 
national government and the political elite to promote a brand of Islamic culture and religion 
throughout the entirety of the country. There is also substantial hostility between the different 
tribes. The army has struggled to deal with this and has taken to arming tribal militias, which 
has on occasion exacerbated inter-tribal conflict (Bassil, 2014). More generally, Zain (1996) 
has argued that the state has played little direct role at the local level, other than 
administration, giving a greater role to the tribal elites, with the expectation that they will 
promote the state’s interest. This, of course, also opens the door for substantial variation in 
corruption and corruption perceptions at the local level within the country. Corruption is 
indeed widespread throughout the country. It includes bureaucratic corruption, corruption 
with respect to the police, the judiciary and medical services and according to Transparency 
International extends to political corruption2. 
2.2 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is unique amongst African countries in never having been a colony, apart from a 
brief period of Italian rule between 1936 and 1941. Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed by a 
military coup in 1974, being replaced with a socialist state. This in turn was overturned some 
two decades later and in 1995 Ethiopia’s first parliamentary elections were held.  The winner 
of that election, Melese Zenawi, remained prime minister until his death in 2012, when he 
was replaced by his deputy. It is primarily an agricultural country and the value added of 
agriculture amounted to approximately 48.6% percent of GDP in 20123. The great majority of 
the population depend directly on agriculture for their livelihoods and many others do so 
indirectly. There is a large land area and in much of the country water resources are 
2 http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/342_Corruption_and_anti-corruption_in_Sudan.pdf 
3 Obtained from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. 
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substantial. But there are large pockets of the country where this is not so and people 
regularly suffer from drought. The literature has tended to regard Ethiopia unfavourably in 
terms of agricultural productivity (Spielman et al., 2010). Dercon and Christansen (2011) 
commented that cereal yields in Ethiopia were currently only about 1,250 kg/ha, compared 
with 2,500 and 4,500 kg/ha in South and East Asia respectively. However, this unfavourable 
record may no longer be correct. There has been a substantial increase in cereal production to 
18,809,959 metric tons in 2012, up from 9,532,780 metric tons in 2003, an increase of 97.3%. 
This compares to an increase of 18.8% in South Asia over the same time period and is also 
substantially greater than most neighbouring countries. Clearly Ethiopia is no longer 
performing as badly as in the past and on this measure at least may actually be counted as 
something of a success story. It is to be expected that this success, as it gradually filters 
through to the economy, will result in more favourable attitudes to the governance structure. 
There is evidence of low official tolerance for corruption and also very low levels of policy 
level corruption (Plummer, 2012). Fighting corruption in the public sector is also a key part of 
the government’s Growth and Transformation Plan. However, the data mentioned earlier 
indicates that although better than many countries in the region, corruption is still a problem 
2.3 Perceptions of Corruption 
There is some debate about how to exactly interpret perceptions of corruption and the nature 
of their relationship with actual corruption. Leaving aside the question of whether we can 
actually use a single measure to define such a diffuse concept as corruption, perceptions of 
corruption may still be a guide to actual corruption within a country and also between 
countries. Thus corruption perceptions form the basis for Transparency International’s 
Corruption Index which we have already cited (Lambsdorf, 2003) and the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2005), which we have also cited. Using perceptions 
about corruption overcomes the difficult problems of both measuring, and indeed defining, 
corruption directly. But it does raise the question of how those being surveyed form their 
perceptions in the first place (Olken, 2009). This is of course the question we seek to answer 
to some degree in this paper. To anticipate some of the answer, we find that such perceptions 
differ according to socio-economic characteristics, e.g. education, which suggests that some 
individual’s at least have erroneous perceptions of corruption and hence measures based on an 
average of perceived corruption, amongst a representative sample of people from the country 
are likely, to be misleading. There is also evidence that perceptions of corruption are greatest 
amongst the worse-off, either in terms of their own situation or the locality in which they live.
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    As might be gathered from Svensson’s (2005) comments mentioned earlier, there has been 
little work done in questioning how individuals perceive corruption and then translate such 
perceptions into concerns. There has been some work at higher levels of aggregation, e.g. 
regions within a country (Sharafutdinova, 2010) and between countries (Davis and Ruhe, 
2003), but less on individuals themselves. One important analysis is that by Olken (2009). In 
his empirical work he found that there was a relationship between perceived and actual 
corruption. He also found perceived corruption to increase with education, decline with age 
and was less for women. He did not use any variables relating to the individual’s location. 
There has been some work done on corruption in Ethiopia. Pathak et al (2007) surveyed 400 
respondents in various parts of Ethiopia. They did obtain data on socio economic 
characteristics, but did not then link this with perceptions of corruption. They did, however, 
conclude that corruption affected local lives, and public sector red-tape was seen as the 
biggest hurdle to improving government-citizen relationships.  
3. Methodology and Data 
We argue that perceptions of corruption are linked to actual corruption within the country. If 
this is all there is to it, then perceptions will be randomly distributed around a simple constant 
term. If there are regional differences within the country, then regional dummy variables will 
also be significant, but no other variables. If however, such perceptions are also based on 
local realities, the location variables will also be significant. Finally there are the variables 
which reflect the individual’s knowledge. In the literature, age and education have been found 
to be significant in this respect. Gender too may reflect knowledge if there tends to be 
different gender roles within a country. But individuals may also get knowledge from those 
around them, and thus the socio-economic characteristics of others in their location may also 
be relevant. Finally, direct experience of corruption, e.g. being asked for a bribe, is expected 
to  influence perceptions of overall corruption within the country.  
    There is also evidence that people are more favourable to governments, the better is their 
own position. This links in with Putnam’s (2000) observation that in all societies the “have-
nots” are less trusting than the “haves” probably because they are treated with less respect. In 
our analysis we will differentiate the haves and the have-nots both in terms of their own 
position and the characteristics of their locality. In terms of the latter we argue that better 
public services generate trust in government and less perceived corruption. Although it is also 
possible that poor public services are poor because of corruption. 
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    Within our study we will be analysing perceived corruption in Ethiopia amongst different 
public servants. These are local, e.g. kebele or woreda civil servants and hence any corruption 
is at the local level. The Sudan variable we analyse is both more general in terms of its scope, 
but also one step removed from actual perceptions of corruption. It uses data on those who 
perceive corruption as being the most important problem facing the country. Hence it also 
depends upon other issues and how important they are. Nonetheless, at any one point in time, 
those are a given for a country as a whole, and we anticipate that increased concern with 
corruption makes it more likely that the individual will identify this as their most important 
problem. Hence it is linked to perceptions of corruption, but is also linked to the perceived 
damage that corruption is doing to the country. If people perceive substantial corruption, but 
do not believe it to be damaging the country, then they are unlikely to identify this as their 
most important issue. It is worth emphasising that despite the deep problems facing Sudan, 
almost one quarter of those asked, identified corruption as the most important issue.  
    The Sudan dataset was collected by Sudan Polling and Statistics Center (SPSC) in 
collaboration with the UK’s Department for International Development on 11-21 July 2013 
and 3-5 June 2014 (see Hamilton and Hudson, 2014 for details). The survey covered all 15 
states which now constitute Sudan. The sampling proceeded as follows: (i) the probability that 
any given locality was selected was proportional to size. Four localities were chosen from 
each state and a cluster was randomly selected from each of these; (ii) households in the 
locality were randomly selected with a replacement sampling strategy; (iii) finally an 
individual who was 18 years or older, was selected from each household, using the Kish 
Table method for selection, to respond to the survey. Field interviewers were allocated to their 
own hometown or countryside. It was felt that this would encourage a capacity to understand 
cultural, social and political conditions. This process resulted in 229 localities being surveyed 
in both years4 – both rural and urban. The survey is done in less than ideal conditions, with 
considerations of security often being a concern. But these concerns did not stop the survey 
and these problems add to the value of the survey data collected.  
    The data in Ethiopia were obtained from the Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey 
(WCBS) undertaken in 2014 using a multi-stage stratified sampling approach based on the 
remoteness and food security levels of households (World Bank, 20125). Within each region 
the sub-sample size was determined by population (based on census data). Data was collected 
4 The localities differed in the two years. 
5
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTMODELSITE/EXTCOUNTRYMODEL/0,,contentMDK:
22838982~menuPK:3968189~pagePK:64027988~piPK:64027986~theSitePK:223224,00.html
9 
on 326 kebeles in 48 woredas6. In total 7,429 individuals were interviewed. Two separate 
surveys were done for rural and urban areas. We focus on the former, partly because it has a 
much greater number of observations, but also as already emphasised Ethiopia is 
predominantly an agricultural country. All the variables are summarised in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
4. Sudan 
4.1 The Data 
Table 3 presents summary data on corruption concerns in Sudan, i.e. those people who 
responded that corruption was the most important issue. We can see that overall almost a 
quarter of those surveyed thought this to be the case. The proportion went down in 2014. This 
does not necessarily signal a decline of concern in absolute terms as other issues may have 
become more pressing in 2014. Of more concern than the variation over time is the variation 
across individuals. Such concern appears less for the young, the less well educated and the 
‘rich’. It is greater for those who live in towns, those who work and particularly those who 
work for government. The latter is interesting, although we do not know whether this reflects 
direct experience or greater knowledge of the problem as the government tries to tackle 
corruption. There are also substantial variations across service quality. With one exception, in 
all cases poor service quality is linked with greater perceived corruption. The exception was 
electricity. We turn to this later. Finally there are substantial differences within Sudan. 
Concern is greatest in Sennar and Khartoum. It tends to be least in North Darfur and Blue 
Nile. Again we emphasise that these are concerns relative to other issues.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The link with education is emphasised in Figure 1. It is based on the average response and 
average education in each location and is restricted to those locations with at least 5 
observations. Most noticeably of the eleven highest observations for corruption concerns, all 
6 The kebele is the lowest administrative tier in Ethiopia’s federal structure, the woreda will consist of a number of 
kebeles.
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eleven are associated with areas of high average education. Overall this suggests that high 
levels of education are not always linked to substantial  corruption concerns, as other factors 
are also relevant, but nonetheless, the greatest concern is associated with areas where there are 
high levels of education.  
4.2 Location Based Regression Results  
Insert Table 4 about here 
    We explore these impacts further with the regression analysis. Firstly we focus on 
regressions based on data defined at the locality, i.e. the average response or characteristics 
based on those in the individual’s location. The results are shown in Table 4. In 4.2 we 
exclude locations with less than five observations. The third set of regressions, 4.3, only 
included service quality variables which were significant. Concern most notably declines with 
the extent to which income covers needs. This suggests that people who live in poor areas 
may see corruption as a cause of their problems. With respect to the service quality, as we 
might have expected from the raw data shown in Table 3, concerns increase with the quality 
of electricity services, but declines with the quality of the police and sanitation. There is 
substantial collinearity between perceived corruption of the police and the courts, and the 
former only became significant when the latter was omitted from the regression. Noticeably in 
this regression, average requests for a bribe is not a significant variable. 
4.3 Individual Based Regression Results  
Table 5 shows the results of the individual based regressions estimated by binomial probit. In 
5.1 we show the results with just individual socio-economic-characteristics and fixed effects 
for the regions and the 2013 observations. Concern with corruption increases nonlinearly with 
age and education and declines with the individual’s relative income. The latter indicates that 
as people’s incomes are more able to meet their needs their concern with corruption declines. 
The impact of education is significantly less for women. In the next column we add the 
location based variables and in the final column we include just those variables which are 
significant. It is upon this which we now focus. The three socio-economic variables already 
identified remain significant, all at the 1% level of significance. Turning to the location based 
variables the more frequent are requests for a bribe, the greater is the concern over 
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corruption7. The remaining significant location based variables are all related to services. The 
better are hospital, sanitation and school services, the less concerned people are about 
corruption. However, the reverse is the case with respect to electricity. Finally the regional 
variables, which are not shown in Table 5, are all jointly significant at the 1% level of 
significance. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
4.4 Interpreting the Sudanese Results  
The results show that both socio-economic, locational and regional variables all significantly 
impact upon concern with corruption. The impact of age and education may well reflect 
knowledge, with the more people learn about corruption in the country, partially in relation to 
other countries, the more they become concerned. The significance of the relative income 
variable may reflect self-interest, that people are most concerned with corruption when they 
themselves are struggling with their income. Most of the location based service variables have 
an impact such that better quality services lead to reduced concern with respect to corruption. 
This may reflect self-interest again, this time with the quality of the individual’s life, as 
reflected by publicly provided services, impacting on their perceptions of corruption. On the 
other hand it is also possible that services are perceived to be poor because of corruption. That 
is money which is intended to be spent on improving services is perceived to be diverted into 
the hands of corrupt officials. The opposite effect of electricity to the other services, is 
consistent with earlier research which found that this had an opposite effect to other services 
in determining attitudes to tribal chiefs (Hamilton and Hudson, 2014). The interpretation put 
on this was that electricity differs from the other services in being a catalyst for economic 
change. The other services improve people’s lives, without changing, at least in the short-
term, economic opportunities. Electricity opens up the way for new industries and new ways 
of working with older industries. But new industries often encounter regulatory constraints 
and herein lies the potential for increased corruption. 
5. Ethiopia 
5.1 The Data 
7 As table 1 indicates, the bribery variable increases as requests for a bribe decline in frequency. Hence the 
negative coefficient shows that as bribery requests decline concern over corruption also declines. 
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Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 6 presents summary data. The variations appear relatively minor – although this may be 
a consequence of using data measured on a four point scale. The disadvantaged do tend to 
perceive more corruption than others. For example, those who at times of the year have no 
food, perceive the police as substantially more corrupt than other people. There are also 
substantial differences between locations. Figure 2 again shows the relationship with 
education. This time it is noticeable that in areas with an average value less than 0.5, 
indicating low levels of corruption, all have an education average of less than 13. That is 
localities characterised by individuals with a relatively low level of education tend to perceive 
less corruption. The upward slope again indicates that as education increases, people perceive 
more corruption, in this case with respect to the police  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
5.2 Location Based Regression Results  
We again explore these impacts further with the regression analysis, once more firstly 
focusing on regressions based on data defined at the locality. The dependent variables in 
Table 7 relate to perceived corruption in both the kebele and the woreda. Perceived corruption 
tends to decline as subjective wealth increases. – Even more strongly is the impact of drought 
and as this increases so perceived corruption also increases. The same is true for education. 
The impact of food shortages is opposite to drought, particularly with respect to officials and 
civil servants in the Woreda. Water shortages are of course dominated by the weather. But 
also of relevance is the infrastructure which can be invested in to deliver water to the 
individual or to supplement water sources.  In that sense local officials and civil servants may 
be blamed for inadequate water and the possibility exists that this is indeed due in part to 
corruption. We delay interpretation of the differing impact of the food shortage until later. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
5.3 Individual Based Regression Results  
Table 8 shows the results based on regressions at the level of the individual. These are 
estimated by ordered probit, with regional fixed effects included. There are substantial 
differences between the estimated models. But in all of them perceived corruption increases 
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as people get older. In addition women tend to be more likely to perceive corruption than men 
and in most cases corruption perceptions increase with subjective wealth, although this is 
compensated for by the opposite impact of locational wealth. Individual education is only 
weakly significant in two equations. But again to compensate for this, location based 
education is significant in all regressions, and in all cases perceived corruption increases as 
the average level of education in the individuals locality increases. This suggests that people 
tend to form their opinions collectively. Location based drought also increases perceived 
corruption. This often reinforces the individuals reaction to their own drought. But there is 
also evidence that people respond to their own drought by increasing trust in the courts and 
the police.    
Insert Table 8 about here 
5.4 Interpreting the Ethiopian Results  
In general drought and food shortages increase perceptions of corruption. There is only 
limited evidence of the reverse effect, for police and the courts, relating to individual 
responses to drought, but this is against the backdrop of a very strong counter effect at the 
level of the locality. Thus overall the evidence is that these two problems increase perceptions 
of corruption. This is consistent with both the hypothesis that people respond to adversity by 
blaming the state and the agents of the state. But it is also possibility that drought and food 
shortages may be linked to corruption with respect to infrastructure projects and emergency 
provision of food. The regressions largely reinforce the results of the location based 
regressions in the previous section, although there was now no evidence that location based 
food shortages lowered perceptions of corruption, an impact which is being captured by the 
individual responses.  
6. Conclusions and Implications 
The contrasting analyses for Ethiopia and Sudan showed two very clear trends. Firstly, the 
importance of education. In Sudan it was individual education and in Ethiopia it was the 
average level of education in the community. The difference, may be due to chance, but also 
may be due to the Ethiopian results being based on rural areas where communities are smaller 
than in urban areas, and also focused on corruption of local state agents, rather than in the 
country as a whole. We should also emphasise that in both countries concern with, or 
knowledge of, corruption, increased with age, which may also be a reflection of knowledge. 
The second point which we should emphasise is that individual perceptions of, and concern 
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with corruption, are impacted upon both by the individuals characteristics and experiences 
and also by those in the locality in which they live. With respect to the latter, in Sudan it was 
the quality of services which were important. In Ethiopia it was more the socio-economic 
characteristics of the community which were more important together with localised drought 
conditions. The fact that there are such differences within the countries geographically, 
between locations and states, emphasises that it is too simplistic to label a whole country as 
being highly corrupt, and probably vice versa. There will be areas of the countries where 
corruption is much less of a problem than other areas, and, equally, areas where it is a more 
substantial concern.    
    This is not to say that if we had had information on service quality in Ethiopia, that too 
would not have been significant. The significance of both local service quality and local 
drought could signify that as an individuals quality of life worsens they become more 
sensitive to corruption. But it could also signify that they identify poor services and 
susceptibility to drought to a lack of infrastructure investment which they link with 
corruption. The differing nature of the data bases is both a bonus and a limitation. On the one 
hand it prevents us doing exactly comparable regressions. On the other hand it allows us to 
analyse different aspects of the issue of corruption both with respect to the independent 
variables and also the dependent variables themselves. It would also have been useful to have 
measures of perceived corruption, covering both local and national levels. With respect to 
Sudan it was concern with corruption which we analysed, in the form of whether people felt it 
was the most important issue being faced by the country. With respect to Ethiopia it was 
perceptions of corruption amongst various agents of the state at the local level. The fact that 
education was important in both sets of regressions suggests that as the countries increase 
their average levels of education, the people in the country as a whole will become both more 
aware and more concerned with corruption. This is consistent with the observation by 
Svensson (2005) who noted a negative relationship, at the country level, between human 
capital and corruption. If such concern can impact upon policy and politicians, as argued by 
Olken (2009), it may gradually lead to a decline in corruption in these countries.        
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Table 1: Comparing Corruption in Ethiopia and Sudan with other Areas 
______________________________________________________________________
Location  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ethiopia 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.00 
Sudan 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Arab World 2.50 2.50 2.60 2.50 2.40 2.30 2.30 2.20 
Developing Countries Only: 
Europe & Central Asia  2.65 2.65 2.63 2.56 2.61 2.67 2.88 3.00 
Latin America & Caribbean  3.44 3.44 3.44 3.44 3.50 3.39 3.39 3.39 
Middle East & North Africa  2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.25 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.80 2.77 2.77 2.74 2.72 2.71 2.78 2.71 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Source World Banks World Development Indicators. The data shows the CPIA transparency, 
accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1=low to 6=high) 
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Table 2: Data definitions 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sudan 
Corruption Coded one if the individual cited corruption as the biggest issue facing 
Concern the country 
Bribe Whether have been asked for a bribe, responses coded 1 to 4, i.e. from in 
the last month, six months, year, and never. 
Age Age in years 
Education Coded from 1 (illiterate) to 9 (PhD) as an increasing measure of 
education. 
Income Household income: Coded 1 (100-500 STG), 2 (500-1000 STG), 3 (more 
than 1000 STG), monthly income 
Relative (to  Coded 1 if the household income was not enough to cover the household 
needs) income bills, 2 if it was enough to cover the household bills, 3 if it was enough to 
cover necessary expenses with nothing left over and 4 if it was sufficient 
to allow saving.    
Marital variables Binary variables taking a value of one if the person was single/married/ 
divorced or widowed.  
Male Coded 1 if the individual is male 
Family size Number of people currently living in the individuals household. 
Urban Coded 1 if lives in an urban area. 
Works Coded 1 if in employment. 
Works for Gov- Coded 1 if works for the Government/Private company. 
ernment/Private firm 
Locality variables (average of responses in individual’s locality)
Service individual response coded 1 if the services they received were at a very 
low level to 5 if they were excellent. Services include electricity, water, 
sanitation, school, hospital, police, the courts and water. 
ETHIOPIA 
Dependent variables 
Perceived as being corrupt (Kebele: civil servant, official, police, courts, Woreda: Civil 
servant, official), Coded 1 for none are corrupt to 3 for all are corrupt   
Independent variables 
Age Age in years 
Education Coded from 1 (no schooling) to 24 (degree) and 25 above degree, as an 
increasing measure of education.  
Male Coded 1 if the individual is male 
Family size Number of people currently living in the individuals household. 
Subjective wealth Coded 1 if the individual classified themselves as poor, to 4 for not 
poor  
Grows crops Coded 1 if the individual grows crops, otherwise 0 
Rears animals Coded 1 if the individual rears animals, otherwise 0 
Drought Coded 1 if the individual suffers from regular periods of drought in the 
sense of a shortage of drinking water, otherwise 0 
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     Table 3: Corruption Concerns in Sudan across individuals, localities and regions 
 All 2014 2013  All 2014 2013 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
All 0.245 0.185 0.317 Region 
Socio-economic characteristics   Aljazeera 0.327 0.3 0 0.355 
Age<34 0.189 0.153 0.223 Khartoum 0.378 0.3 0 0.457 
Education<5 0.226 0.171 0.273 Algadareaf 0.32 0.213 0.427 
Income=1 0.396 0.245 0.476 North State  0.123 0.0 0.247 
Bribe<4 0.255 0.198 0.317 Red Sea 0.343 0.28 0.407 
Married 0.285 0.199 0.359 Blue Nile 0.152 0.171 0.133 
Single 0.297 0.226 0.373 Kassala 0.334 0.3 0 0.371 
Gender=1 0.251 0.181 0.377 River Nile 0.323 0.213 0.433 
Urban 0.28 0.205 0.368 North Darfur 0.125 0.156 0.098 
Work 0.288 0.232 0.37 North Kordofan 0.217 0.047
 0.387 
Works for government 0.344 0.234 0.416 Sennar 0.413 0.467 0.36 
Works for Pte Co. 0.27 0.237 0.29 South Darfur 0.143 0.015 0.276 
Income supplemented 0.243 0.2 0.275 South Kordofan 0.164 0.053
 0.28 
Divorced/widowed women 0.276 0.15 0.48 West Darfur 0.216 0.193 0.238 
Divorced/widowed men 0.265 0.197 0.332 White Nile 0.283 0.207 0.36 
Services poor(i.e. <2.50 
Electricity 0.23 0.118 0.326     
School 0.286 0.164 0.361     
Police 0.267 0.164 0.364     
Sanitation 0.292 0.206 0.365     
Court 0.26 0.15 0.348     
Hospital 0.286 0.193 0.359     
Water 0.273 0.181 0.349   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The data reflects the average response, hence a value of 0.245 indicated that corruption was the 
most important issue facing the country.   
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Table 4:  Location Based Results for Concern with Corruption 
 4.1 4.2 4.3  
__________________________________________________ 
Bribe -0.0054 -0.0062 -0.0145 
(0.14) (0.21) (0.51) 
Education 0.0341*** 0.0334*** 0.0383***
 (3.34) (3.73) (4.21) 
Relative (to needs)  -0.0279 -0.0338** -0.0293*
income (1.50) (2.09) (1.86) 
Absolute income 0.0139 0.0249 0.0235 
  (0.73) (1.48) (1.36) 
Electricity 0.0447* 0.0813*** 0.0771***
 (1.71) (4.41) (4.63) 
School -0.0188 -0.0257  
 (0.54) (0.93)  
Police 0.0137 -0.0166 -0.0363**
 (0.36) (0.58) (2.05) 
Sanitation -0.0131 -0.0643*** -0.0716***
 (0.41) (2.82) (3.60) 
Courts 0.00056 0.005  
 (0.02) (0.17)  
Hospital -0.0882** -0.039  
 (2.42) (1.31)  
Water 0.0247 0.0137  
 (1.10) (0.70)  
Dummy variable  0.1235*** 0.1401*** 0.1524***
for 2013 (5.52) (7.10) (7.91) 
Constant 0.1583 0.1596 0.1266 
 (0.93) (1.25) (1.02) 
__________________________________________________ 
Observations 438 409 409 
Log Likelihood 69.92 116 111.6 
R2 0.217 0.279 0.263 
__________________________________________________ 
Notes: Estimated by OLS; t statistics in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10%  
levels of significance. Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticty. Variables defined in 
Table 2. 
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Table 5:  Individual Based Results for Concern with Corruption 
 5.1 5.2 5.3 
___________________________________________ 
Married -0.047 -0.0075  
 (0.92) (0.14)  
Log age 0.2575*** 0.1947** 0.1843***
 (3.37) (2.46) (2.86) 
Gender -0.128 -0.135  
 (1.02) (1.04)  
Education 0.1239*** 0.1126*** 0.0986***
 (7.17) (5.97) (8.17) 
Urban -0.0399 -0.0212  
 (0.89) (0.46)  
Absolute income -0.00091 -0.026  
 (0.03) (0.83)  
Relative (to needs)  -0.0515*** -0.032 -0.051***
income (2.94) (1.65) (2.99) 
Log of family 0.0403 0.0649  
size (1.03) (1.59)  
Works 0.0545 0.0791  
 (0.88) (1.25)  
Works for -0.0657 -0.0846  
government (0.95) (1.20)  
Work for private -0.0069 -0.0653  
firm (0.08) (0.76)  
Women's -0.060*** -0.0652*** -0.046***
education (2.68) (2.83) (5.77) 
2013 Dummy 0.4514*** 0.3774*** 0.385***
variable (9.81) (7.23) (8.60) 
Village Based Variables 
Bribe  -0.1932*** -0.1667**
 (2.70) (2.42) 
Education -0.0017  
  (0.06)  
Relative (to needs)  -0.0961**
income  (2.06)  
Absolute income 0.0866  
   (1.52)  
Electricity  0.1446** 0.1748***
  (2.53) (4.24) 
School  -0.2068*** -0.1287**
  (2.85) (1.96) 
Police  -0.0739  
  (1.00)  
Sanitation -0.1542*** -0.1275***
  (2.65) (2.64) 
Courts  0.0341  
  (0.41)  
Hospital  -0.1173 -0.1491**
  (1.49) (2.03) 
Water  0.1365**
  (2.00)  
Constant -2.085*** -0.4517 -0.5523 
 (7.01) (0.94) (1.35)   
_____________________________________________ 
Observations 4257 4154 4405 
Log Likelihood -2241 -2159 -2323 
X2 453.6 505.7 506.8 
_____________________________________________ 
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Notes: Estimated by probit; t statistics in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes  
significance at the 1%/5%/10%  levels of significance. Standard errors  
have been corrected for heteroscedasticty. Regional dummy variables  
included. Variables defined in Table 2, 2 represents the likelihood ratio test statistic.  
Table 6: Summary Data for Ethiopia  
 Kebele    Woreda  
 Civil servant Official Court Police Civil Servant Official 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Individual Characteristics 
Age<35 0.778 0.936 0.972 0.94 0.755 0.928 
Low education 0.815 0.939 1.022 1.009 0.787 0.933 
Poor 0.862 0.97 1.011 1.003 0.819 0.954 
Male 0.806 0.919 1.016 1 0.762 0.907 
Drought 0.958 1.031 1.053 1.038 0.936 1.022 
No Food 0.862 1.06 1.138 1.106 0.811 0.996 
Crops 0.83 0.951 1.046 1.032 0.792 0.945 
Animals 0.788 0.934 1.066 1.055 0.741 0.941 
Regions 
Tigray 0.948 0.968 1.116 1.129 0.957 0.899 
Amhara 0.963 1.113 0.96 0.938 1.055 1.089 
Oromia 0.836 1.041 1.123 1.117 0.811 1.043 
SNNP 0.635 0.624 0.854 0.782 0.484 0.613 
BenushangulGumz 0.962 1.026 1.139 1.138 0.875 1.066 
Afar 0.672 0.678 0.745 0.781 0.654 0.713 
Somali 0.763 0.928 1.198 1.317 0.732 0.954 
Gambela 0.679 0.741 1.074 1.091 0.481 0.704 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The above represents the averaged response for perceived corruption of different officials, civil 
servants, etc. Basic variable coded 1(none are corrupt) to 3 (all are corrupt). Hence a value of 0.778 lies 
between some are corrupt and none are corrupt. 
Table 7: Location Based Results for Perceived Corruption
Kebele       Woreda   
 Officials Civil Courts Police Officials Civil 
  Servants    Servants 
 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Subjective  -0.1572** -0.1998*** -0.0197 -0.0613 -0.1969*** -0.2404***
wealth (2.16) (2.80) (0.26) (0.74) (2.67) (3.56) 
Education 0.0409*** 0.0203*** 0.0234*** 0.0188** 0.0383*** 0.0172**
 (5.36) (2.63) (2.86) (2.00) (4.88) (2.40) 
Drought 0.3465*** 0.3214*** 0.2143*** 0.1777** 0.3491*** 0.3921***
 (5.17) (4.86) (3.14) (2.52) (5.29) (6.15) 
No Food -0.2835* -0.3142* -0.0726 -0.2553 -0.3754** -0.5337***
 (1.67) (1.92) (0.44) (1.54) (2.36) (3.08) 
Constant 0.909*** 1.06*** 0.817*** 0.979*** 1.032*** 1.137***
 (4.18) (5.18) (3.53) (4.25) (4.86) (5.80) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations 275 273 274 274 275 275 
Log Likelihood -77.64 -72.58 -105.2 -115 -82.4 -71.15 
R2 0.233 0.158 0.073 0.053 0.226 0.201  
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Estimated by OLS; t statistics in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10%  
levels of significance. Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticty. Variables defined in 
Table 2. 
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Table 8:  Individual Based Results for Perceptions of Corruption 
 Kebele         Woreda   
 Officials Civil Servants   Courts   Police   Officials Civil Servants 
      8.1         8.2    8.3   8.4   8.5 8.6 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Individual based variables 
Log 0.1942*** 0.1896*** 0.3132*** 0.3214*** 0.2226*** 0.1644***
age (3.55) (3.35) (5.43) (5.67) (4.03) (2.92) 
Education -0.0055 -0.003 0.006* 0.0036 -0.0057*** -0.0069*
 (1.48) (0.79) (1.65) (1.00) (1.58) (1.80) 
Male -0.0632** -0.0486 -0.0702** -0.0878*** -0.1119*** -0.0794***
 (2.12) (1.59) (2.34) (2.94) (3.73) (2.61) 
Log -0.0944*** -0.0423 0.0058 0.0157 -0.0486 -0.0629*
family size (2.64) (1.13) (0.16) (0.42) (1.34) (1.70) 
Crops 0.0441 0.0913* 0.1764*** 0.1987*** 0.029 0.0164 
 (0.89) (1.69) (3.48) (3.91) (0.56) (0.32) 
Animals -0.0921*** -0.1374*** 0.0677* 0.0575 -0.0761** -0.1784***
 (2.64) (3.68) (1.84) (1.54) (2.15) (4.94) 
Drought  0.0552 0.3886*** -0.1024*** -0.0721* 0.0983*** 0.3726***
 (1.45) (9.89) (2.65) (1.88) (2.64) (9.61) 
No food 0.3002*** 0.0692 0.1712** 0.1827*** 0.2303*** 0.1429**
 (4.73) (1.01) (2.51) (2.65) (3.51) (1.98) 
Subjective 0.0284 0.0012 0.0436* 0.0694*** 0.0273 0.0578**
wealth (1.32) (0.05) (1.92) (3.01) (1.26) (2.54) 
Location based variables 
Subjective  -0.1423** -0.2301*** 0.0433 -0.0462 -0.1814*** -0.3006***
wealth (2.28) (3.56) (0.67) (0.71) (2.96) (4.53) 
Education 0.056*** 0.0437*** 0.039*** 0.0354*** 0.0504*** 0.0401***
 (8.78) (6.55) (5.97) (5.35) (7.97) (5.86) 
Drought  0.4015*** 0.0525 0.5062*** 0.443*** 0.3298*** 0.1788**
 (5.63) (0.73) (7.14) (6.22) (4.76) (2.50) 
No food 0.1399 0.0109 0.098 -0.1986 0.1661 -0.1005 
 (0.80) (0.06) (0.56) (1.14) (0.93) (0.55) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations 6033 5750 5798 5827 5956 5956 
Log Likelihood -6430 -6079 -6267 -6359 -6634 -6037 
X2 577.5 438.9 396.2 427.3 506.7 653 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Estimated by ordered probit; t statistics in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 
1%/5%/10%  levels of significance. Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticty. 
Variables defined in Table 2, regional fixed effects are included in all equations. 2 represents the 
likelihood ratio test statistic. As dependent variable increases, perceived corruption declines. 
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Figure 2: Location Perceived Police Corruption and Education
